the public intellectual, part two

In “If you build it they will come: Blogging and the new citizenship,” Tim Dunlop suggests that bloggers are the new public intellectuals. He narrows this down to stating that political bloggers are those in the running for being considered public intellectuals, with political blogs being those “which concentrate on providing a running commentary on either local or international political affairs.” The idea of the public intellectual, according to the definition Dunlop winnows from multiple other sources, is better thought of as the public intellectual practice, which is “the practice of engaging in public debates about matters of social and political importance.” A blog, fostering public debate between academics/experts and lay people, can provide a forum for such practice.

 

Interestingly, as Dunlop addresses the issues of partisanship and truth, he suggests that the ideal of the detached, disinterested commentator on events is outdated and ought not be considered appropriate for intellectual practice. The rational for this argument is that, in a civic society/populist democracy, it is necessary for a person to be partisan. Active citizens must be emotionally involved, and defining “intellectual” as requiring disinterest creates a dysfunction by suggesting that active citizens cannot simultaneously be public intellectuals. Thus, Dunlop argues that blogging is creating a new arena for public intellectual practice, and the question of partisanship is not so much a problem as simply information that ought to be considered along with the content.

 

This is a surprisingly loose and yet functional definition for “public intellectual” that Dunlop is providing, particularly if we ignore his definition of “political” for blogs and instead use his concept of the public intellectual practice. Discussing “political affairs” is not necessarily one and the same as debating “matters of social and political importance.” For instance, it seems irrational to claim that a blog post about the state of the public education system on either a local or national level is not appropriately placed in the realm of public intellectual practice, but such a post would not be considered one about political affairs.

 

The importance that Dunlop places upon the give-and-take debate nature of blogging might well be anathema to the academic world, many residents of which would consider themselves intellectuals, perhaps even public intellectuals. However, it seems to me that Dunlop is right in saying that a public intellectual practice requires debate. If we consider the classical Greek and Roman world, those men whom we would most likely consider public intellectuals frequently and regularly debated their ideas in public, and did so in the vernacular of the day. Given that, why would we feel it appropriate now to restrict the label of “public intellectual” only to those who publish for money or academic credit in peer-reviewed journals or hypothetically nonpartisan newspapers?

the public intellectual, part one

Cynthia Ozick, in “Quarrel & Quandary,” suggests that the role of a public intellectual is to accept and understand that history is the present time as well as the past. As such, we must deal with it. We must deal with the here and now of our generation and make distinctions between morally acceptable acts and morally unacceptable acts. Rather than defining the term “public intellectual” primarily on the basis of either portion of the term, Ozick seems to be suggesting that the defining aspect and duty of the public intellectual is to provide moral guidance according to her judgment.

 

Ozick’s commentary on morality addresses the idea that we should have sympathy for our enemies, or that “I have seen the enemy and he is us,” spending more time on this concept than on the definition of a public intellectual. (Although, as I noted initially, Ozick’s plans for the public intellectual are largely morality-based, so this does make sense.) The problem is that Ozick doesn’t seem to see any middle ground. If the public intellectual is supposed to be an individual capable of making appropriate moral judgments, then is it not irrational to expect specific moral judgments of that individual? Isn’t that the equivalent of saying, “To be a good person, you need to make your own decisions,” and in the next breath adding, “Good people never drink alcohol because alcohol is bad”?

 

I would have thought that the entire point of having public intellectuals is for them to decide and argue on a rational basis for moral decisions. As such, any insistence that only one moral path is open to the public intellectual ought to be viewed with intense suspicion. Ozick claims that “…in a jurisprudential democracy especially—a moment may come when it is needful to be decent to our own side…”

 

I would pose this question to Ozick: what is “our own side”? Does she mean the American side? The side of our political party? The side of the Western world against developing nations? And if there is a “side,” then do we truly have anything that could rationally be considered a public intellectual? A “side” suggests partisanship, whereas “public” implies universal accessibility and/or consideration. It seems as though what Ozick really wants from a public intellectual is a person who sees things the way she does. It’s a goal I can sympathize with, certainly, but not a definition I can support.